Wednesday, March 2, 2011

assumed consensus

I believe that the “curious atmosphere of assumed consensus” was the main cause of the Bay of Pigs. Schlesinger and other dissenters were impacted by the uncritical environment of their White House meetings. While Schlesinger had many issues with the supposed consensus opinion, he remained largely silent during the meetings. Had he or other dissenters spoken up and defended their critical viewpoints, perhaps the incident may have been avoided entirely.

One attribute of the group that intrigued me was their blindness to the obvious reality of the circumstances. The group’s underestimation of Castro’s military power is an apparent example. Castro’s army consisted of approximately 200,000 troops. Kennedy’s administration believed that their team of 1,400 exiles could succeed against Castro’s much larger military, despite being out numbered 140 to 1. The degree to which the group misjudged the situation is shocking.

Clearly, the Kennedy administration was a bit optimistic of their side’s power (it seemed like they were a bit delusional). However, I do not believe Kennedy’s advisers deserve all the blame. They were interacting within an environment that used social pressures to discourage any serious suggestion that challenged the assumed consensus. In his role of President, Kennedy himself heavily influenced and shaped this uncritical setting. His demeanor towards his advisers impacted their willingness to challenge his opinions. Additionally, when choosing his cabinet, Kennedy often valued the advisers’ loyalty more than their expertise. Both of these factors influenced the unfortunate outcome of the Bay of Pigs. In the end, it seems that both the advisers and Kennedy were blameworthy.

1. What ways could the advisers maneuvered the uncritical environment and be taken seriously?
2. How can incidents of groupthink be reduced in a group that you are involved in?

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