Chance Events Leading to the Bay of Pigs Invasion

These two articles on followership presented several intriguing concepts. One of these was the idea of “groupthink,” which was explained in the context of the Bay of Pigs Invasion in Irving Janis’s article, Groupthink. I agree with the article in that Kennedy and his followers exhibited many characteristics of groupthink, such as a feeling of invulnerability, an overoptimistic outlook, and a desire to maintain a unanimous outlook within the group. However, I also believe that a few chance events allowed for groupthink to become deeply established in Kennedy’s circle, and that these events helped lead to the Bay of Pigs Invasion. For example, it was by chance that the two CIA agents who had been developing the Cuban invasion project, Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell, were also closely affiliated with the Kennedy team. This relationship encouraged Kennedy and his inner core of followers to accept the CIA’s invasion plan despite its many potential consequences. This is because it would have been harmful to the unity of the group if members of the group began questioning the closely affiliated CIA agents. I think that if the agents had not had a connection with the Kennedy group, then groupthink would not have been as strong of a factor in the ultimate decision to go through with the plan, as members would feel less obligated to agree with the CIA’s beliefs. Another chance event that may have affected the final decision of the group was the fact that one of the last meetings ended before all of the members could vote on the plan. This is significant because Schlesinger, who was strongly against the plan, did not get to place his vote and express his opposing viewpoint. Also, I think that it is important that McNamara happened to be one of the first to express his final opinion on the matter since he was a prominent leader in favor of the operation. As a result, pressure was placed on subsequent group members to agree with McNamara in order to maintain the peace and unanimity of the group. I believe that if a member of the group who was vehemently opposed to the plan, such as Schlesinger, expressed his viewpoint first, subsequent members may have voted differently or at least reanalyzed the situation more critically. Thus, groupthink was able to flourish partially due to chance events, ultimately encouraging the acceptance of the CIA’s proposal.